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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE
OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
9116

DANNY GLISPY and
JAMES HALLAM,
Defendants and
Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not dispute the statement of facts
set forth in appellant's brief, except that Dr. A. C. Curtis
began his examination of prosecutrix at 11 o'clock. (T-5)
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
A DOCTOR TO TESTIFY THAT HIS EXAMINATION INDICATED THE COMPLAINING
WITNESS HAD BEEN A VIRGIN PRIOR TO
THE TIME OF THE EXAMINATION.
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POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION DIRECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A NOT
GUILTY VERDICT.
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE COURT DID ERR AS URGED
IN APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II, SAID
ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
A DOCTOR TO TESTIFY THAT HIS EXAMINATION INDICATED THE COMPLAINING
WITNESS HAD BEEN A VIRGIN PRIOR TO
THE TIME OF THE EXAMINATION.

Here the exact question objected to by appellants is
as follows: "Now does a hymen which is intact normally
indicate a person who is a virgin?" Over appellants' objections, the question was allowed and was answered
"Yes."
At the time of making his objection, counsel for appellants claimed it was "immaterial." In his brief he now
claims that the only effect of the question and answer was
to excite passion and prejudice in the minds of the jury.
Respondent does not believe that the question was
asked in an attempt to excite passion and prejudice, nor
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that such was its result. It did not stand by itself, but instead was asked in a context which included other questions, the intent and effect of which were only to show
that the prosecutrix had recently experienced sexual pentration.
The transcript of testimony, beginning at line 28 of
page 5, and continuing to line 16 of page 6, reads as
follows:
"Q Would you tell us what you observed, Doctor, which led you to believe that she had had
intercourse?

A Yes. On the examination table she was put
in a good position where we could make an examination of her female organs and we found the
perineum covered with blood and mucus and
serum, and by opening the lips of the vagina we
could see the hymen, and the hymen had been
torn, and it was recently torn because the tears
were fresh and they were still bleeding.
Now does a hymen which is intact normally
indicate a person who is a virgin?
Q

MR. CHRISTENSON: We object to that as being
immaterial?
THE COURT: He may answer.
A Yes.

Q And you say in this case the hymen had been
torn?
A Yes.
Q

And there was blood on it?

A

Yes?"
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As is readily seen, the fact of sexual penetration necessarily had to be proven in order to establish that rape
had occurred, since it is a necessary element of the
crime.
So, properly, the District Attorney asked the doctor
how, from his own observation, he came to believe that
intercourse had taken place. In his answer (at line 1,
page 6 of the transcript), he testified to his examination
of the prosecutrix' female organs, one of his observations
being that the hymen had been torn and that tears were
fresh and still bleeding.
It was a logical and normal thing at this point for
the District Attorney to ask the question to which appellants object since some members of the jury might not
have known, had the doctor not so stated, that an intact
hymen is an indication of a woman who has not experienced sexual penetration, and by the same token that
a torn hyn1en indicates the possibility, at least, of one
whose organs have been penetrated sexually.
It is difficult to imagine how the jury could have become inflamed with passion and prejudice upon hearing
this scientific question and its answer when it had notalready become so upon hearing the preceding question and
the gruesarne details in the doctor's answer, a question,
incidentally, which was not objected to by appellants.
Respondent believes the question about the hymen
was in all regards proper, and that it was asked only in
an effort to give the jury an understanding of female
physiology sufficient to enable it properly to render its
verdict. Respondent does not believe that it aroused pasSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sion and prejudice in the minds of the jury, particularly
in light of the other questions in the context of which it
was asked.
The first sentence of appellants' first point states:
"The general rule is that in prosecutions for rape by
force and without consent, evidence of the prior chastity
of the prosecutrix is inadmissible as a substantive defense
* * *." Respondent believes that the word "chastity''
was used in error and that the word properly should have
been "unchastity." (44 Am. Jur. 958)
The text cited by appellants on page 7 of their brief
and the Scott case deal entirely with attempts by defendants to show unchastity on the part of the prosecutrix.
Here, quite to the contrary, her chastity was shown. It is a
fair assumption that a 15-year-old girl who has been raped
was, up to that time, a virgin, testimony to the contrary
being inadmissible, and the proof of the assumed fact
certainly is not prejudicial to the defendant.
Finally, even if error did occur, respondent does not
believe it was prejudicial, under all the circumstances.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTION DIRECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A NOT
GUILTY VERDICT.
Respondent cannot understand how appellants seriously can urge that evidence in the record was not such
that the jury could properly bring in a verdict of guilty.
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True, there was some conflict, particularly as to circumstantial or inconsequential matters in the testimony
of the three girls, all of whom were called to the stand by
the State. However, the existence of such conflict did not
in any way preclude the jury from giving full credit to
the testimony of the prosecutrix while at the same time
disregarding or discounting testimony of the State's other
witnesses in conflict therewith.
The State's case could have rested entirely upon the
testimony of a single witness, the prosecutrix, and there
was no absolute necessity for the testimony of the other
girls at all, nor was the jury obligated to believe what
they said.
The Utah case of Seybold v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 239 P2d. 174, 121 Utah 61, states that in this
way:

"* * * After referring to a variety of methods of
phrasing the rule and a great many authorities he
[Wigmore] concludes the section with this: 'Perhaps the best statement of the test is: Are there
facts in evidence which if unanswered would
justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the question which the plaintiff is bound
to maintain.'
"We approve the rule thus stated by Mr. Wigmore.
If there is any substantial competent evidence upon

which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could
make the finding, it should stand."
Here the prosecutrix stated clearly and simply that she
had been raped by the defendants. This was the important
thing. In addition her further testimony was such as to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

show an opportunity as to time and place for the performance of the acts.
As a matteT of fact, the testimony of the other two
girls to the effect that they were gone from the car for
perhaps five minutes would not, in and of itself, even if
believed, necessarily eliminate the possibility of rape, since
the act could have been accomplished within such a time
period. The estimate of the girls at best was only a guess
and this, of course, was taken into consideration by the
jury.
Obviously the same period of time would seem much
shorter to the two others who were off in the canyon
"going to the bathroom," than to the prosecutrix fearfully
engaged in fighting off two men trying to rape her.
·Interestingly, even defendant Hallam estimated the
time at ten minutes (T-58).
One of the other two girls called by the State was a
sister of one of the defendants. (T-45). The jury had the
right, said relationship having been placed in evidence,
to consider the same, and to evaluate her testimony in the
light thereof. The interest or bias of a witness, or the absence thereof, should always be considered as affecting
the weight of his testimony.
Appellants rely somewhat on Schlatter v. McCarthy,
196 P.2d 968, 113 U. 543, and quote the following statement from that case:
"Generally a party who calls a witness vouches
for his veTacity and cannot afterwards impeach
such witness, either by testimony of an impeachSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing witness or by argument to the jury and he
may not argue to the jury that such witness is
unworthy of belief."
Here, however, the State is not attempting to impeach
any of the witnesses even though they did give somewhat
contradictory testimony on minor points.
The Schlatter case goes on, however, in some detail
to point out that a party is not bound by everything stated
by his witness. The actual language of the court, occurring
on page 975, is as follows:
"* * * But a party is not bound by every statement that his witness makes, and he may, by
testimony of other witnesses and in argument to
the jury, show that the facts were different from
those testified to by the witness. This is permitted,
not for the purpose of impeaching the witness (although it may have that incidental effect), but
for establishing the true facts. It would be a monstrous rule that would bind a party to every statement of every witness produced by him. It is common experience that several eye-witnesses to an
occurrence will have different versions of the
same transaction. A party who calls several eyewitnesses is entitled to argue before the jury that
they should believe the facts to be as testified to by
the witness most favorable to him. This is not an
attack upon the veracity of the other witnesses
called by him whose testimony may be different in
some respects from that of others, but merely an
attempt to convince the jury that the facts are
really as contended by him. * * *"

As to the ultimate question, that is, whetheT or not
sexual penetration occurred, only the prosecutrix, of the
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three women, was in any position to know, since the seat
of the automobile was lowered, (T-62) and since the other
two women were at least 30 steps away from the car in
the dark. (T-47).
The only really important question was, did appellants commit unlawful sexual acts with the prosecutrix
or did they not? The question of the amount of time
available for the perpetration of the act is not of grave
consequence. This is not a matter of circumstantial evidence alone, as to the commission of the act, but instead
is one of direct testimony by the person best able to know
the facts.
At page 12 of appellants' brief, they claim that considerably more than two hours elapsed between the time
of the alleged attack and the time when the complaining
witness was examined by Dr. Curtis, who stated that her
injuries in his opinion had occurred within one or two
hours previously. Appellant says this is so because the
evidence indicated the parties arrived back in Payson
before ten minutes to 10:00 p.m. and that the attack must
have occurred prior to this time.
It is submitted that appellant is in error in setting
midnight as the time of the examination, since it is clearly
set forth on page 5 of the transcript at lines 4 through 7
that the examination began at 11:00 o'clock.

Thus, even assuming Dr. Curtis' opinion as to the
two hours was correct, the attack still could have taken
place as early as 9:00 o'clock and been within his estimate,
since while the transcript is not specific on the point, it
is likely Dr. Curtis' estimate of the time of the attack
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was. made with reference to the time of beginning of the
examination--or 11:00 o'clock.
It is interesting to note that while the other girls said
they did not hear prosecutrix yell and scream (T. 43, 45,
47;) as she claims to have done (T-36), Defendant Hallam
himself testified that prosecutrix "started kicking and
hollering 1 ' (T-73) when he tried to pull her pants down.
On appeal the courts are reluctant, of course, to overrule findings of fact made by juries. This rule has been
stated and restated time and time again. In a recent Utah
case entitled Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 299 P.2d
622, 5 U.2d 187, decided in 1956, the court, speaking
through Justice Crockett, said:
"This case having been tried to a jury, they were
the exclusive judges of the evidence and of the inferences to be drawn therefrom. It was not the
privilege of the court to disagree with and overrule their action unless the evidence so unerringly
pointed to a contrary conclusion that there existed
no reasonable basis for the jury's finding. This
court has many times affirmed commitment to a
policy of reluctance to interfere with findings of
fact and verdicts rendered by juries, and has declared that it should be done only when the matter
is so clear as to be free from doubt * * *."
POINT III.
EVEN IF THE COURT DID ERR AS URGED
IN APPELLANTS' POINTS I AND II, SAID
ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.
One good statement of the court's general attitude in
this regard is that taken from the case of State v. Neal,
262 P.2d 756, 1 U.2d 122:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"We are also conscious of the fact that a trial in
the courts of this state is a proceeding in the interest of justice to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and not just a game. We will not reverse criminal cases for mere error or irregularity.
It is only where there has been error which is
both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the
accused that a reversal is warranted. The defendant was entitled to a full and fair presentation of
the case to a jury of unbiased citizens and to have
his rights safeguarded by competent counsel."
CONCLUSION

The Court did not err in permitting a doctor to testify
that his examination indicated the complaining witness
had been a virgin prior to the time of the examination,
nor did it err in denying appellants' requested instruction
directing the jury to return a not guilty verdict.
If, however, eTror was committed in either regard,
such error was not prejudicial to the substantive rights
of the appellants and therefore their appeal should be dismissed and an order issued affirming the decision of the
Trial Court.

Respectfully submitted
WALTER L. BUDGE

Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY

Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
Oct. 20, 1959
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